eyes. In the right, in which the attack was of a primary nature, the cornea had sloughed; in the left, the disease had appeared secondarily-the effect being extensive ulceration and opacities of the cornea. The attack of small-pox had occurred six months previously.
REMARKS. This case is particularly instructive; as, some time after the invasion of the primary eruption, wlhich was attended by so much local disease that one cornea was destroyed by sloughing, another distinct disease, involving also specially the cornea in the other eye, was set up. Nothing seems more probable than that the primary affection was a variolous pustule, having its seat in the conjunctiva and cornea, running a rapid course, and producing mortification of those parts in the same way that variolous pustules act in other parts of the body; and that after a certain interval of time, when the local affection had subsided, the constitutional taint predisposed to the secondary inflammation which seems in such cases to have a tendency to attack some of the vital parts of the organ, which had escaped the more dangerous primary disease. This secondary affection being altogether milder than the other; in this instance, there is every reason for thinking that the disease was perfectly curable. GENERAL REMARKs. The cases above noticed afford good instances of the particular forms of the corneitis, which owes its origin to variola. In almost all, the disease showed itself in the most severe form, the one which rapidly runs into destructive ulceration of the structure, instead of into the granulo-vascular degeneration. This proneness to a destructive form of inflammation would be easily accounted for if we could look upon the disease as simply a variolous pustule formed upon the membrane, as in other parts of the surface of the body, but the history of the case will seldom permit us to look upon the case as being one of this description. Indeed, it has been doubted whether the specific variolous pustule is ever formed on the surface of the body, by observers who have had so much experience in small-pox as Dr. Gregory and Mr. Marson, who say that the phlyetenula or pustule that is found to arise in the consecutive stages of variola, are identical with those which arise in common catairhal or scrofulo-catarrhal conjunctivitis (see Wharton Jones's second edition, page 163).
However, I have seen several cases in which a pustule or ulcer was formed upon the conjunctiva or cornea, ultimately affecting both structures at the same time with variolous pustules on otlier parts of the face and body. In such cases the pustule has been much more rapidly destructive in its effects than where it has occurred in the succeeding stages of the small-pox, and has in fact produced the same changes, leading to mortification of the subjacent parts, as the variolous pustule does upon the cutis. There seems to be no reason why the specific pustule should not occur as well upon the conjunctiva, which possesses a combination of characters of the skin and mucous membrane, as upon the skin of contiguous and continuous structures. The last of the cases given above seems to confirm this view, for one eye had been lost by a destructive affection of the cornea, which had occurred contemporaneously with the pustuiles on the body; the other eye being only secondarily affected with an inflammation which was much milder in character than the disease which had caused mortification of the cornea in the first eye. Nothing seems more probable than that in this case we had an exemplification of the two kinds of variolous affections of the cornea; in the one the specific pustule leading to destruction of the part implicated; in the other, the milder form of sympathetic secondary corneitis having its origin in a predisposition, caused by the disease having taken effect upon the constitution. At the same time, the fact of only one case in six reported having the appearance of being an instance of specific variolous pustule of the eye, indicates that such a case must be rather rare.
With regard to the period after the accession of an attack of variola, at which the secondary affection, which ushers in corneitis and ulcer of the cornea, comes on, it seems to be subject to considerable variations. Some authors say that it is about the eleventh or twelfth day from the first appearance of the eruption, and when the secondary fever has commenced, (see W. Jones, second edition, page 162); but in the six cases above noted the time varied from the tenth to the twentysecond day after the appearance of the eruption, and the average was eighteen days, so that when this affection occurs secondarily, in most cases probably it is on account of not so much the secondary fever, as of the dyscrasia produced by the disease. of paramiount imiportance. Those who thus speak, seem not to know how many months, and sometimes years elapse before an artificial limlb can be worn with comfort; how many ueans of obtaining subsistence are debarred from one so m-utilated; I uphold that any length of time is well spent, which gives the patient the chance of escaping this dreadful alternative, from wvhich, as Mr. HIussey of Oxford has shown, not only do imany die, but many more never thoroughly recover.
I will conclude by describing the way in wiich the hamstrin, tendons are divided and treated, when this proceeding becomes necessary in combination with the above. Let the pacienit lie horizontally on his face; an assistant grasps and extends the leg. A small sharp-pointed knife is passed to the innaer side of the tendon and beneath it horizontally. As soon as it is fairly under the tendon, turn the sharp edge upwards, and divide from within outwards, i. e., from the popliteal space to the skin. The biceps flexor cruris is usually the most tense, but such is not always the case. Sometimes the outer hamstring tendon alone requires division; sormetimes both outer and inner. In many cases after the division, the tendon's numerous tight bands spring up when the.
extension is kept up. Care must be taken not to wound the popliteal vessels and nerves, should interference with them be deemed uecessavy. Extension generally suffices. The operation being completed, pledgets of lint are put on the wound, and fixed there by adhesive plaster. The limb is supported by a bent turned splint, and rolled from the foot upwards. It is best to allow a week to pass before any attempt at extension is made, because by proceeding too quickly, the parts of puncture may be irritated, and the treatmenit delayed. The chief danger consists in the division of the peroneal nerve; aud such an accident has happened. It occasions the patient considerable alarm, but in the course of time the divided nerve reunites, and sensation and motion are both restored.
I N S A N I T Y. By JoHIIN WATSON, M.D., Soutlhampton. WE are indebted to the advocates of phrenology for having of late years given an impetus to the study of insanity. It is a questio.a, however, whether this science has not introduced some disadvantages; among whiclh may be placed the attempts that have been made to 0listribute the different manifestations of this affec.ion to different port;ons of the brain, in accordance with their supposed subserviency to the different groups of mental faculties; and thus further to complicate a sufficiently difficult subject. I propose in this paper (1) to adduce reasons for rejecting the view first promulgated, I believe, by the late Dr. iPrichard, anid adopted, under the same or some equivalent name, by most recent writers both at home and abroad-that we can have what is called moral insanity, while the intellectual powers remain unaffected; and (2) to view the entire question from a different stand-point.
1. That insanity can be anything else than an aberration of a man's intellect is a startling proposition. It would be quite as reasonable to separate such cases as exhibit sensory illusions into a distinct class under the head of sensatioral in. sanity (thus mistaking an accidental cond:tion for the essential disease), as it is to affix the term moral insanity to those cases which exhibit particular excitement or perversion of the moral sentiments. In a proper, restricted sense, indeed, terms expiessive of the cause or course of insanitv are in common use, such as religious, homicidal, suicidal, puerperal, etc.; but these are merely qualifying expressions, and are not used in contradistiaction to insanity of the intellect. And, in the same way, tbe term moral insanity, meaning the moral causes or moral consequences of insanity, would be unobjectiorable. Etymologically, this plhrase means either nnsoundness of morals, which is vice, or insane conduct, which is simply an inseparable accompaniment of insanity, and reveals it. But, beyond the objection there is to the phrase itself, the doctrine it represents will not, I think, bear investigation. It is meant that the sentimants, the emnotions, as distinguished from the intellect, are inisane. Emotion, I submit, may be designated as warm, enthusiastic, cold, depressed, perverted, or non-existent; it may be in excess or deficiency; but to call it insane is meaningless, and, if ever conventionally allowable, cannot be permitted in scientific language. In examining the various sources whence human actions spring, we shall find them reducible to either an instinctive impulse or a motive; the first being a motion of thie organism, and the last a conception of the understanding. To which class does moral insanity belong? If to the former, then it is the province of a sound intellect to restrain its irregular instincts and emotions; but if to the latter, then we have insanity, properly so called. But, again, the distinct line that exists in the mind between the operations of the understanding, and the sentiments or emotions, is entirely overlooked by the advocates of this doctrine. Our moral nature is said to consist wholly in these sentiments or emotions; thus forgetting the fact that a moral judgment invariably precedes a moral sentiment, and that they stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. A little reflection will make this apparent. The sentiments of reverence and gratitude towards God follozu a rational conception of his being and attributes; remorse, the judgment that we have acted basely; pity, the conception of suffering; indignation, that of injustice; and so on. "The perception", says Royer-Collard, " of the moral qualities of human actions is accompanied by an emotion of the soul that is called sentiment. It is a fact that, by the contemplation of a beautiful action or a noble character, at the same time that we perceive those qualities of the action and the character (perception, which is a judgment), we feel for a person a love ningled with respect, and sometimes an admiration that is fall of tenderness. A bad action, a loose and perfidious character, excite a contrary perception and sentiment." (Cousin's Lectures, by Wight: The True, the Beautiful, and the Good. Lect. 13.)
These considerations point to the conclusion that no real distinction exists between intellectual and moral insanity, and that moral insanity necessarily implies intellectual misconception.
2. Reverting to the general question of insanity, and bearing in mind that any lengthened metaphysical details are unsuited to the pages of a strictly medical journal, I will now attempt to draw an outline of the subject, merely stating results which I assume (if need were) could be fully established.
The world of mind is revealed to each individual in his own consciousness, and an attentive examination of what passes therein will satisfy us that all its phenomena may be grouped, as is ordinarily done, under the three heads-I. Operations of the understanding; 2. Feelings; and 3. Voluntary power. A still more careful examination enables us to divide the operations of the understanding into two great classes-1. Intuition or spontaneity; and 2. Reflection, or the logical faculties. In its intuitional activity, the reason acts by insight, seeing " the truth as the eye does light, only by being directed toward it." (Locke's Essay, bk. iv, ch. 2.) Hence do we derive all universal necessary truths, and the first principles of all knowledge. (See Reid, Sir William Hamilton, and Cousin.) In its reflective activity, reason acts by reasoning (observation, deduction, and induction); and hence do we derive all relational knowledge, and the arts and sciences. The feelings also are diTisible into-1. Sentiments or emotions; and 2. Sensations. Sentiment is defined as a sensible response excited by a conception of the understanding. Sensation, on the other hand, is excited by or through a bodily organ, and may be either an instinct or the action of one of the special senses. The will is the free power we possess of determining inward or outward activity.
As giving distinctness to what has just been written, I may be allowed to reproduce it thus:-CONSCIOUSNESS. 
